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Abstract— Successful enforcement of information security 
requires an understanding of a complex interplay of social and 
technological forces. We focus on organizational security policies, 
and on power in organizations, drawing on socio-technical 
literature to develop an analytical framework. We present three 
case studies from a large empirical study in an international 
company including 55 interviews with staff members at all levels; 
each study highlights a different aspect of our framework. We 
suggest ways in which our framework enables existing security 
policies to be re-thought. We conclude by showing how our 
findings complement recent research in the institutional 
economics of information security. 
Keywords: information security; organizations; Actor-
Networks; socio-technical systems 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we analyze information security as a 
manifestation of forms of power: the productive form of power 
as power-to, dominant power as power-over, and power as the 
intended or unintended working out of technological and social 
changes. [6, 39].  
Power, then is the theme, but power with technology. Ever 
since researchers at the Tavistock Institute [36] first analyzed 
the social implications of technical changes, it has been clear 
that to understand technology in social structures – that is, all 
technology that actually exists – it is necessary to reject what 
Burrell & Morgan 1979 [7] refer to as the “techno-functionalist 
paradigm” in favor of an approach to technology which takes 
seriously both the technical and the social. 
As these early researchers showed, new, more “efficient” 
working arrangements manifest themselves in new forms of 
power, in which some workers find themselves disadvantaged 
and, in response, adopt various forms of defense, “even though 
they may not always be clear as to the exact nature of the 
resentment or hostility they often appear to feel” [36:16]. This 
socio-technical understanding of power is paralleled by 
rejection of traditional “Hobbesian” or sovereign power [14] 
towards a view of shifting, unstable power expressed through 
networks and alliances [13]. 
The argument, at its most basic, is that information security 
cannot simply be imposed by rule (as “sovereign power”), but 
emerges from the interplay of social and technical actors. This 
realization is a challenge to conventional security thinking, 
which emphasizes written policies and endorsement by senior 
management (for example, [37]). These are the necessary 
underpinnings of information security, but says nothing about 
the on-the-ground enactment of polices in everyday practice. 
Understanding the interplay between the social and the 
technical can guide us towards formulating security policies 
which are acceptable to users and which meet the needs of the 
organization.  
This highly relevant literature has been largely neglected in 
socio-technical applications to information security. Certainly, 
there is a wide socio-technical literature adapting cognitive and 
psycho-social concepts such as trust to design robust online 
market places and collaborative environments [26, 34] and the 
awareness that real threats from “social engineering” and 
human error arise more from social than from technical 
vulnerabilities. Economics [2, 4, 22] has also provided insights 
into the costs and benefits of security practices to organizations 
and individuals.  
It is not that these analyses ignore power, but they assume 
that power is simply there, taken for granted, and, in a sense, 
invisible. Yet, while not often explicit, power underlies the 
implementation of information security policies. Organizations 
may assert their policies through enforcement in various ways; 
yet for each enforcement there is a reaction. Individuals have a 
choice in the extent to which they comply with security 
policies, and their choice is based on their goals, perceptions 
and attitudes {Beautement, 2008 #6;Weirich, 2005 #23;Adams, 
1999 #22}. 
In this paper, we “stand back” and explore the nature of 
power within an organization by going back to earlier socio-
technical literature and recent insights in the study of 
organizations. We relate this to cognitive factors, the needs of 
“homo economicus”, and social engineering threats. Our aim is 
to integrate the insights into guidance for senior information 
security officers who are, after all, managers, and required to 
balance many competing considerations with the overall 
organizational imperative to support the business needs of the 
organization [33]. 
We draw our findings from 55 interviews with employees 
in a large international company, conducted between May and 
October 2010. Our interviews were semi-structured around a 
 pre-prepared schedule, which was sufficiently flexible to allow 
for later to explore emerging issues. These were fully 
transcribed and analyzed using Grounded Theory [11, 21], a 
well-established methodology to generate unifying theories 
from qualitative data and validate findings in a process of 
continuous comparison. 
II. POWER IN ORGANISATIONS 
Although power has been studied extensively in 
Information Systems (eg by [24]) it has been less studied from 
the point of view of information security. Here, we develop our 
security framework from seminal literature in the sociology of 
power and technology. 
A. Dimensions of Power 
A simple intuitive – or, as Lukes [31] says, “one-
dimensional” - view of power is that “A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do” [14]. This is potential power – A can get B to do 
something, but does not necessarily in fact do so. This view 
also implies conflict, or at least a difference in preferences – B 
would not necessarily prefer to do the thing that A would like 
him or her to do. 
However, this simple view focuses too much on power 
which is “actual and observable” [31:27]. It is “behaviorist”, 
looking at decisions which have been taken and observed, and 
on wants which are expressed or repressed. More recent 
literature, influenced particularly by Lukes [31] and Foucault 
[19] has developed the realization that power operates in many 
complex and competing ways, through “micro-physics” [19, 
29], as well as through social rules that are not necessarily 
clearly observable. “A may exercise power over B … by 
influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants” [31:27].  
This more nuanced understanding fits very well with our 
data; in this organization of knowledge workers [16] - that is, 
of “responsible individuals who exercise power” [31] - the 
organization is not “sovereign”, in any simple sense, but asserts 
its “power in-the-world” [23:119] through play of strategic 
forces. Rather than a force which acts directly, we could think 
about power as like a “billiard table that is skewed or made 
uneven” [12:209]. 
B. Power and trust 
As we shall show, even where policies are enforced by 
technological means – firewalls, filters, software and hardware 
configuration - this enforcement is rarely total. Despite the 
technological controls, the organization has to trust its 
employees not to circumvent or otherwise negate policies, even 
if there is a strong technological enforcement in place [17]. 
Trust necessarily involves the acceptance of risk; trust is “an 
attitude of positive expectation that one’s vulnerabilities will 
not be exploited” [35:386]; there is expectation, not certainty. 
Conversely, the trust thereby placed in employees is nearly 
always only one part of a web of social and technological 
power through which security is maintained in the 
organization. 
Yet, while the concern of security policies is ostensibly to 
prevent “bad things from happening” [8] – while maintaining 
availability - to protect systems and data from external or 
internal threats, the actual operation of these policies in mainly 
disciplinary, in Foucault’s [19] terms. That is to say, it is 
concerned much less to punish malicious acts than it is with 
non-compliance; while the intention is to prevent, this is 
enacted by requiring positive effort on the part of employees, 
through myriad small rules. This carries a cost: as Beautement 
et al [5] have shown, compliance is a limited resource. 
In this paper, rather than taking trust and enforcement as a 
dialectic, we consider both as different facets of power. In the 
remainder of the paper, we develop a framework, based on 
developed from Clegg’s [12] Circuits of Power model, and use 
it to analyze some specific studies of security in action, drawn 
from our empirical research. Using this framework enabled us 
to identify the breakdowns in security policies, and to suggest 
ways in which these might be overcome. 
III. POWER AND TECHNOLOGY: “TECHNOLOGY IS SOCIETY 
MADE DURABLE” 
How does an organization assert its policies? Certainly not 
by expecting employees to read and then follow written 
documentation or rules; in this organization, few participants 
are even aware of the existence of written policies (on the 
company intranet). Rather, power is inscribed and normalized 
through micro- and macro-level “circuits” of integration (to use 
Clegg’s [12] explicitly electrical metaphor). 
A. Episodic Power 
The most obvious and easy accessible instances of power, 
as an organization asserts the need for information security, are 
the passwords, ID cards, open or closed work spaces, open or 
closed computer builds, firewalls, etc., which form the daily 
practices of information security. As the most visible 
manifestations of power, these practices are easily mistaken for 
the totality; this is the “normal power” of most social science 
and security studies. 
But the achievement of the aims of a security policy 
depends on 1) the alignment between the policy and its 
intended outcome as well as 2) the level of compliance with the 
policy, so that any security measure must be both “correct” and 
“dependable” (actually being used as intended) [17]. This 
micro level focuses only on the dependability in the details of 
Figure 1: Representing the circuits of Power: from Clegg [12:214] 
practice; we have to go beyond these most evident phenomena, 
to consider how best to achieve the desired outcomes. 
Episodic power draws from, and leads into, “macro-level” 
circuits of power in which “rules, relations and resources” 
[12:211] are reproduced or transformed, fixed or re-fixed, 
facilitated or restricted. These other circuits, which Clegg [12] 
terms the circuits of social and system integration, make up a 
“field of force” within which certain fixtures of meaning are 
given more power; an actor network [10] is constructed. 
B. Social integration 
Social integration in the “dispositional” circuit of power 
centers on the construction of meaning. This construction may 
draw on (or “enroll”) various human, social and technological 
actors and techniques of control, but power comes from the 
meaning that is attached to each of these entities. 
Latour [28] provides an illustration of human and non-
human domination as an artifact and its associated network – 
hotel customers and their room keys - is progressively 
transformed, via polite notices and a heavy weight attached, so 
that customers leave the key at the hotel front desk rather than 
walking off with it, not because they have read the polite notice 
– they might not even speak the language – nor because they 
are particularly well-mannered, but because “they cannot do 
otherwise. They don’t even think about it” [28:105]. There is a 
clear parallel with Lukes’ insight that “power is at its most 
effective when least observable” [31:1].  
Hotels? Room keys? There is, superficially, only a slight 
link with information security (Latour is not concerned with 
doors, only with keys); that is the strength of the framework. 
This very general framework applied to information security 
strengthens our analysis, allowing us to put to one side our pre-
existing assumptions about “the social”, “the technological”, 
and “power”; we are “agnostic” in our assumptions, and 
“symmetric” in our approach to technology and society [9]. 
C. System integration 
While recognizing that “society” and “technology” work 
together, it is also useful analytically to maintain a separation 
between social and “system” forces: “material conditions most 
obviously include the technological means of control over the 
physical and social environment” but also “the material means 
of organization” [30:251]. System integration covers whatever 
an organization uses, whether technology, physical constraints, 
or rules backed up by contractual enforcement, to enforce the 
institutional patterns. This is also productive power, or “power-
to”, and hence also facilitative power [12]. 
Employee compliance is harder to obtain where there are 
tensions between social and systems integration; that is, where 
requirements imposed by rules or technological means are in 
conflict with social expectations [1]. In the wider context, these 
tensions may lead to institutional change, but also to resistance, 
strain, and failure to meet organizational aims. 
An “obligatory passage point” – a concept drawn from 
Actor Network Theory [9, 10] - is the crux of these circuits of 
power [23]. This can be thought of as a rhetorical device; one 
set of actors presents a problem in a way which asserts that 
there is “no alternative” but to see the solution in a certain way, 
and then to “enroll” the other actors around this central 
problem; power, then, is a construction of meaning in such as 
way as to favor the interests of some actors over others. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
Our 55 interviews covered employees at all levels of the 
company and their interactions with the organizational security 
policies. From our knowledge of the policies, we had some 
specific areas of interest to explore, but we were keen to 
encourage wide-ranging discussion and narratives around the 
ways these policies are encountered in everyday working 
practice. 
At the highest level of attitudes to security, we developed 
our interview schedule around three dimensions: 
 How much do participants know about organizational 
security policies? What training and induction have 
they received in security policies? 
 To what extent do they comply with these policies? If 
they do not comply, how do they express this non-
compliance and what reasons do they give? 
 How much do they think others know and comply with 
the policies? What is the organizational security 
culture? 
Our research was based in an industry with a strong safety 
culture, and this safety culture extends to all staff. But does this 
strong safety culture extend to information security? What are 
the interplays between physical and information security? 
Although we were interested in security policy and 
compliance across all areas, we focused particularly on specific 
policies around acceptable use, ability to install and configure 
software on PCs and laptops, physical security practices – clear 
desk, screen locking, and controlled access to sites, and 
encrypted USB sticks – a policy that had been recently 
introduced. 
Our Grounded Theory analysis produced a total of 3320 
quotations labeled with 3114 raw codes organized by these 
policy interests, annotated with 311 memos (short notes made 
during Grounded Theory analysis), which we then organized 
into networks and families. Unlike other studies that have 
applied Clegg’s [12] model to information security [27], we did 
not start from the intention to place organizational power at the 
centre of our data analysis. Rather, following Grounded Theory 
[21] tradition, we started from the data, with little more than 
the general intention to investigate from the data the responses 
of individual staff members to organizational rules; thus, the 
search for a suitable theoretical framework was deliberately a 
posteriori. 
V. APPLYING POWER: THREE CASE STUDIES IN 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
To show how this works in practice, and to explore the use 
of our framework for information security policies, we analyze 
three situations of power in the company. 
In the first study, compliance is largely enforced through 
technological means; in the second, compliance is not enforced 
directly, but by rule; in the third study, social norms are 
 enrolled to assist in compliance, but, as we shall see, these 
norms both strengthen and, in other ways, act against 
compliance. 
A. Study 1: Technological Enforcement:“Closed build” 
Our first study analyses a situation in which compliance is 
actively enforced by technological means: restricted use of 
software on company-issue personal computers and laptops, 
enforced through a “closed build” which requires approval by a 
manager and action by outsourced technical support to install 
or configure software. A similar policy restricts acceptable use 
of the Internet and external email through filters and firewalls. 
In our analysis (Figure 2), the actors – employees, the 
company, computers, software, outsourced technical support, 
and also actors such as colleagues and customers, with their 
demands on staff - are “enrolled” to a problematization that 
asserts “locked-down access” as an obligatory passage through 
which access to software must pass. The construct is not 
actually quite as simple as “no use of non-standard software”; 
the policy provides for negotiable use of other software or, in 
exceptional cases, a computer build that is more or less open. 
Adding or re-configuring software takes time, however; and the 
company is trying to reduce the use of open builds. 
1) Response 1: Acceptance 
We start by noting that many participants express 
themselves unaffected by the acceptable use policy; they never 
have a reason, in the course of their work, to use non-standard 
software. Yet these participants, too, are complying with the 
policy and are, in fact, affected by it, not by what they are “got 
to do” [14], nor even by what they are prevented from doing, 
but in what they do not even consider doing. In these situations, 
we can say that the company has successfully stabilized the 
meaning of “acceptable use” to the extent that staff members 
comply without even considering alternatives: 
No we don't have rights to most things. You know you 
can’t do anything really, very much. And I mean 
truthfully most of us don't know what to do anyway – 
European staff member 
The “closed build” avoids security problems from unknown 
software or viruses, problems with maintaining multiple 
versions, etc. - but this enforcement carries costs. These costs 
are in terms of employee time, and hence productivity: 
I mean, it’s a pretty tedious process, but you just put in 
the request for what you want, fill in a form, send the 
request away, and then it gets approved by your 
manager. – European staff member 
In effect, maintenance is more centralized and controlled, 
constraining the availability of software; and this, too, carries 
organizing costs [32]. Company power is maintained by 
disempowering staff members, in Clegg’s [12] terms: 
P: I wish I had administrator access though.  
I: Is that because you find it gets in the way, not 
having it, or … 
P:  It has, occasionally, um, you know, and it’s more 
along the lines of, … I don’t know if I actually care 
about administrative access to my laptop, but …, 
because [the standard build includes some] outdated 
programs, there are things I can’t do that I’m used to 
doing on computers. – North American staff member 
2) Response 2: Avoidance 
Even though the policy is enforced by technological means, 
this does not mean that compliance is total; a participant 
describes a simple form of avoidance, using a home computer 
when software required for business uses was not readily 
available: 
I think I tried to download Skype …, because I was 
helping … on some project, I had to communicate with 
China. So I was trying to do that through a company 
computer it wouldn’t, it wouldn’t work. 
I: So, um, so, so what did you do then? 
Well, I used my home computer. – North American staff 
member, closed build 
Avoidance allows the user to get the job done; it is a 
resistant action to avoid centralization, not to avoid the policy 
as a whole. This enforcement is shown to be doubly 
problematic: the participant felt forced to avoid the rules, but 
nevertheless was inconvenienced both in attempting to obtain 
the software and in making the eventual circumvention. 
3) Analysis 
Everything revolves around the construction of “locked-
down access”, in the form of “closed build”, firewalls, filters, 
etc. In Callon’s [9] terms, these are “obligatory passage 
points”. But it is clearly not the case that that all access to 
software must necessarily pass through these points. Certainly, 
company policy is enforced if accesses do pass through the 
obligatory points; but the policy is easily circumvented if an 
employee – or their software – rejects the approved route by, 
for example, using their home computer instead. 
There is contested meaning. The security policy constructs 
points through which all access must pass, but, against this, 
staff members also ascribe meaning to the process in their own 
Figure 2: Locked-down access to “closed build” PCs and external Internet 
terms as “business needs”; an alternative reading which simply 
does not require passage through these “obligatory” points.  
B. Study 2: Trust in Situations of Contingency: USB sticks 
Our second case study focuses on a policy that had been 
recently introduced in the company. This is the requirement 
that, whenever data is transferred onto an external USB “thumb 
drive” or “memory stick”, the device used must be a 
company-issued, 256-bit encrypted drive of a specified brand. 
This aspect of security policy is of particular interest 
because of its recent introduction. From the point of view of 
enforcement, the issue is interesting because such a policy 
clearly could be enforced using technological means, but, at the 
time of our research, was not being so enforced. 
Use of encrypted USB sticks is clearly an important tool to 
preserve confidentiality – the “C” in the “CIA” model [38]. It 
does not in itself prevent other USB-associated risks, such as 
that of importing viruses and malware on media of unknown 
origin, but some participants spontaneously mentioned this 
issue, and, potentially, the requirement to use only company-
approved media could also reduce this risk. 
1) Actors and Factors in (non)-compliance 
The ban on unencrypted USB sticks in the company is, in 
principle, absolute. However, this absoluteness is challenged by 
employees in least two ways: 
 Will the USB stick and its data leave the immediate 
work area, or the company building? 
 How sensitive is the data (perceived to be)? 
For example, a common use of USB sticks is to transfer 
data onto a colleague’s computer, or to take it to a nearby 
printer – in this way, potentially actually reducing the risk of 
data leakage through unattended printing over a network. 
As intended by the company, this policy relies strongly on 
episodic power in the daily practices which are to be followed. 
That is, the emphasis is on micro-techniques of enforcement, 
with very little leeway allowed for alternative interpretations. 
In practice, in the absence of technical enforcement, this power 
is weak; instead, the power circuits of social and system 
integration come to the fore. 
2) Non-human actors: USB Sticks and Data Transfer 
However, both in the episodic and social/system integration 
circuits, there are non-human factors in operation that 
discourage compliance with the policy. Our findings confirm 
those of Beautement et al. [4, 5] in terms of the risk of 
embarrassment if an important presentation cannot be given. 
Additionally, some of our participants mentioned problems 
with size and reliability of the company-approved USB brand: 
… Sometimes, if you’ve got a big document you know, 
sometimes 1 gig is not enough … so I’ve struggled to 
get it on- …. Sometimes I’ve got a document on to give 
to somebody in the office, the others in the office, …I 
only need to leave there for a short period of time. And 
it’s not really that sensitive… - European staff member 
A strong dis-incentive to use the company-approved USB 
sticks emerged in terms of cost. Here we noted a wide 
divergence of practice across the company, with some groups 
purchasing the approved brand in sufficient numbers for each 
employee, contrasting with other groups in which the approved 
sticks were not available; and we found correspondingly varied 
practices in USB stick use across the company. 
The case also illustrates nicely the interplay of emerging 
technologies, as increasing use of shared, access-controlled 
filestore – now ubiquitous in large organizations – implies that 
ad-hoc methods such as USB sticks for transfer data are less 
and less necessary. At the social level, organizational decisions, 
such as managers’ choice to provide budgetary allowance for 
company-approved USB sticks, and variable training practices, 
come into play; compliance is therefore highly dependent on 
external contingencies. 
3) Analysis 
This second study provides a useful comparison to the first; 
there are more complex contingencies in terms of variable 
access to the technology, and also more alternative routes to the 
overall goal of getting the job done. Returning to the metaphor 
of an obligatory passage point, enforcing passage of data 
through the approved USB route and not through any other 
requires several contingencies to work together. Several actors 
must be enrolled to act together [9], and that, without this 
alignment of actors, non-compliance becomes the easier path. 
Technically, it would be possible to disable USB transfers 
altogether – as has sometimes been done in this company. This 
could deny all USB file transfers, or only unencrypted access. 
So the rule on its own is a move towards trust in employees. As 
with closed builds, if the accepted path through the controlled 
obligatory point is not available – if there is tension between 
the company-approved and localized meanings - then “business 
need” is likely to be the dominant discourse.  
C. Study 3: Physical security and social norms 
It is rarely the case that policies are enforced using purely 
either technological or social constraints, however. In this third 
case study, we investigate issues around physical security 
policies that rely on a mixture of social and system power for 
their enforcement. System power, in this study, is itself partly 
technological – physical access control on doors, electronic 
access cards for staff – and partly mediated by humans - 
dedicated security staff and receptionists. 
1) (Non)-Obligatory Passage Points 
Physical security begins with access to the car park, where 
a barrier and, sometimes, a security guard controls access. 
However, access by other means is not controlled at this stage.  
The second, and most crucial, point of access control is at 
the point of entrance to the building. This is a very physical 
example of an obligatory passage point – unlike the barrier to 
the car park, which can be avoided in various ways. 
First problem: there is in reality often not one single 
entrance, hence no single “passage point”. Second problem: the 
apparently obligation at to identify oneself at the building 
entrance is only partial; doors can be held open politely, or 
intruders can rush through doors which have been left ajar 
accidentally. 
 2) Human Actors in Alliance with Technology 
The company could install turnstiles or some other strongly 
physical barrier, but this might be difficult where there are 
many entrances. Instead, the company has chosen to form 
“alliances” [9, 28] with the staff members themselves, who are 
strongly encouraged to avoid “tailgating” or “piggy-backing”. 
Further allies are “enrolled” in the form of large notices by 
each entrance. Some entrances also have a card reader, which 
“beeps” and flashes red or green, but is left to staff members 
themselves to verify whether this is a “red beep” or a “green 
beep”, so this still requires human actors to play their parts. 
Staff members are not always willing to accept the role of 
“security enforcer”, however; moving from “interessment” to 
“enrolment”, in Callon’s [9] terms, requires negotiation. The 
desire of the company for enforcement pulls against the normal 
social politeness towards other staff members, as well as their 
natural desire to avoid confrontation: 
you do tend to recognize people, but I think in this day 
and age, you don’t want to confront people, it can make 
it a bit awkward – European staff member 
Nevertheless, with the help of additional “allies” – the large 
signs, along with a wish to ensure a workplace which is safe for 
themselves and their colleagues - compliance with the rule is 
said to be high: 
I think people are pretty honest with it. I haven’t myself 
... I’ve heard people reference that other people tried to 
piggy back on them, but I think for the most part the 
majority of people coming in and out of the building are 
following that policy”. – North American staff member 
This compliance, however, – like that of the hotel 
customers in Latour’s [28] example – comes at a cost. Latour 
says that increase in the AND dimension, progressively 
excluding outsiders, comes at the cost of “enriching” the 
desired program of action with a series of “translations” in the 
OR dimension. 
There is, then, a technological cost; but the cost is also felt 
in the tension felt by staff between company requirements and 
their own social nature. This cost and tension arises 
fundamentally from the lack of “fit” [30] between the social 
and systems integration; staff are asked to comply in ways 
which run counter to normal social convention. 
This tension is expressed, amongst other ways, by 
avoidance in various ways: “having a quiet word” (rather than 
direct confrontation) or changing practices in subtle ways to 
avoid the situation of confrontation: 
I have to time it so that he at least swipes his card. So if 
I hear the beep, of course I don't know if it's a green 
beep or a red beep, I don't know [what] happens. So if 
he swipes it and it beeps, then I’m fine, so I, it, it's a bit 
of a struggle. So I try and if I see him, fortunately it's all 
glass so I can see the person coming. So I try and slow 
down my walk … - North American staff member 
3) Analysis 
Figure 3 is based closely on a figure in [28] – physical and 
social (and potentially human) “actants” are successively added 
to the network so that outsiders are increasingly excluded 
behind the barrier (represented by the solid vertical bar). At one 
extreme, all doors are locked, and insiders as well as outsiders 
are excluded; with open doors, the circuit is one of enablement 
as well as restriction. With only a door and no control, 
outsiders as well as insiders are allowed in. Progressively 
adding a card reader, with a beep and red or green light, and 
signs to remind staff of the “No Tailgating” rule, fewer 
outsiders get within the barrier, while other outsiders are 
distanced further from the inside space.  
The final two rows go beyond the actually existing physical 
security to show the “physical access” construct as it might be 
with either a physical barrier, or where social norms have 
changed so that “no tailgating” overcomes any residual 
politeness that staff might feel towards potential outsiders; 
now, all outsiders are excluded, but at still further costs in 
technological (barrier) or social (politeness) terms. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
A. Technology in Trust and Enforcement 
In these three studies of areas of security practice, we have 
considered – as a first pass analysis – the tools available to a 
security manager in terms of trust “versus” enforcement of the 
policy. But, as we have seen that in practice there is almost 
never complete “enforcement” and never complete “trust”. In 
the first case study, we saw that employees with a “closed” 
build use “unofficial” circumventions such as using a home 
computer when required software is not immediately available. 
If it could somehow be arranged that enforcement were 
total, staff would become merely “relay-agencies” with no 
interests beyond those of the “strategically subordinating 
agency”; literally, non-actors in any meaningful sense. 
Conversely, “high discretionary strategic agency” expresses 
power in ways that are “less prohibitive and more productive, 
more facilitative of desired outcomes through the disciplined 
discretion of the agency of empowered authorities” [12:199]. 
However, this is not an argument that enforcement should 
always be minimal. That would be the logical conclusion if 
compliance were viewed as the antithesis to resistance, and 
resistance, in turn, as a response to increasingly strong security 
enforcement [27]. This zero-sum view of power [13] offers 
little to help security decisions; if security enforcement actions 
always produce an equal and opposite reaction, then security 
Figure 3: Successively adding actants to control entrances 
 can exist only is a state of static equilibrium, under constant 
tension, and at permanent risk of a loss or shift of equilibrium.  
B. Contested meanings 
A better metaphor is to consider resistance, not in 
opposition to security requirements, but rather like electronic 
impedance, so that the “flow” of power around the circuits is 
inhibited at various points [12]. By considering 
non-compliance as one among many potential responses to 
security practices, rather than as a negative practice to be 
prevented, we shift the central point – the “obligatory passage 
point” – of our analysis from resistance to meaning.  
Actors attach different meanings to security practices. We 
can see this most clearly in the case of use of unencrypted USB 
sticks; users frequently circumvent policies but it is almost 
never the case that users simply refuse to comply; 
non-compliance is nearly always given as for “a reason”, and 
this reason is usually expressed in terms of the business needs 
of the organization, which, as we have said, is not so much 
resistance as an alternative, and equally legitimate, meaning. 
This new formulation offers a way forward for re-thinking 
security policy and enforcement. Rather than taking “locked-
down access”, “encrypted USB sticks”, or “controlled access to 
the building” as the central points around which trust, 
enforcement, and technological and human actors are supposed 
to revolve, the security manager can shift the circuits of power 
to closely mirror the needs of the business; we could say that 
“business needs” are the main “actor” who must interesse [9] 
the other actors in the network. 
Seen from this viewpoint, the question becomes, not 
technology “versus” human enforcement, but “how can 
meaning be most successfully stabilized around the needs of 
the business?” Clearly, the “techniques of discipline” [19] in 
the circuit of system integration could be made more “solid”, or 
“reified”, but at the cost of more tension between the system 
and social integration, leading inevitably to resistance. As an 
alternative, and more positive reading. Davenport & Leitch 
[15] argue that the use of “strategic ambiguity” to delegate 
authority can empower stakeholders while at the same time 
increase the power of the agency which deploys it. 
C. Toward an Acceptable and Usable Security Policy 
To see how this is useful, we apply our model to one of our 
case studies – the “closed build” policy (Figure 4). We start, 
following Callon [9] by rejecting a priori assumptions that 
“locked-down access” is either “correct” or “incorrect” against 
some normative values. Clearly, if our policy relies on “closed 
build” as an obligatory passage point, then this policy is 
effective only to the extent that staff members accept to pass 
through this point. By using, for example, a home computer to 
bypass the approved software build, the passage point which 
we have so carefully constructed is no longer “obligatory”; all 
the other actors – controlled software, technical support, 
managers and their approval – which we have enrolled around 
it become irrelevant. 
Where users feel the need to so blatantly reject their 
ascribed place in the socio-technical network, this is not a 
failure on the part of the user, but a breakdown – “an 
interruption of the smooth unexamined flow of action” [18]. 
Such “breakdowns” are a strong clue to tensions between the 
circuits of system and social integration [12]. Figure 4 shows 
how the control over software installation might be re-thought 
by placing “business needs”, rather than “closed build”, at the 
centre of the network of actors. Both “closed build” and “home 
computer” are possible routes for a staff member to meet the 
business needs of the company and customers. 
However, neither of these “passage points” completely 
meets the business needs. The thick curved arrow on the left 
indicates that “closed build” encounters resistance in the form 
of the need to pass through technical support – introducing 
delays. Using a home computer avoids this resistance, but 
introduces new risks. Clearly, the circuit could be “balanced” 
by either reducing the resistance on the left-hand route – 
perhaps by making technical support more easily available – or 
by increasing resistance on the right-hand route. Both of these 
choices involved explicit or hidden organization costs, 
however. 
Alternatively, and more productively, both left- and right-
hand routes could be replaced by rejecting these established 
passage points, and building a network centered instead on the 
business needs. By clarifying the flows of power around the 
network, other, more imaginative solutions can be explored. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
It is well-established that security threats are socio-
technical; humans are social beings, neither machines nor 
unconnected individuals – actors rather than mere “factors” 
[3]. In this paper, we return to seminal socio-technical literature 
in order to develop a view that encompasses both the technical 
and the social, without privileging or making assumptions 
about either. 
Our findings resonate with consistent themes in the 
literature around the relations between organizations and 
technology: centralization, de-centralization, hierarchy, and 
co-operation. From the perspective of information 
asymmetries, transaction costs and principal-agent 
relations – central themes of new institutional economics 
- Pallas [32] investigates the security implications of 
co-ordination and motivation in organizations,. Enforced 
Figure 4: Re-thinking circuits of power in acceptable use enforcement 
control introduces hierarchical organization costs while at the 
same time relies on (human) actors who may not always 
comply – a clear instance of a principal-agent problem [25] – 
which we could re-specify, in Callon’s [9] terms, as a failure of 
interessement. 
We have brought ideas from the sociology to bear on these 
questions. Rather than accepting economic forces as natural, 
inevitable phenomena, we have analyzed the complex network 
of actors which work together to privilege certain meanings 
over others. In this way, we have sketched a way to combine 
sociological and economic perspectives; to focus not only on 
why there are always economic interests but, at macro as well 
as micro levels, to start to show how these pressures operate 
and how they may be enrolled to the benefit of organizations 
and their members. In this way, we have developed an 
understanding which has opened up these complex networks 
for our inspection, and hence for potential change; it becomes 
possible to “penser autrement” [20:15], to think differently, 
about the possibilities.  
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